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Abstract Courts and legal tribunals increasingly decline to serve as religious or
moral guardians, and require social evidence to support litigants’ claims. Recent
cases on emergency contraception and abortion are examined to show how judicial
interpretations can take account of evidence of the impact that different understandings of the law will have for how ordinary people can plan their lives and
reproductive choices. In an emergency contraception case, an interpretation was
rejected that would have criminalized choices that millions of decent, law-abiding
physicians, pharmacists and women routinely make. In an abortion case, three
judges unanimously rejected a government ministry’s defence of compliance with
the law because the ministry had failed to investigate the needs within its
jurisdiction for legal clarity, lawful services, and its responsibility to women
returning from having lawful procedures elsewhere. In both cases, litigants prevailed
who showed factual evidence that their claims better promoted reproductive health
and choice.
D 2006 International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics. Published by Elsevier
Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Reproductive health law has emerged from centuries of belief that human reproduction, occurring
within the secretive and inaccessible recesses of
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women’s bodies, was a realm of supernatural or
divine ministry and intention. Often a focus of
human hopes and fears, the chance of reproduction was not a domain that allowed human
intervention or control. Indeed, human restraint
of women’s reproduction was legally condemned,
although castration of vanquished men was an
historically accepted military practice. Until 1969
in Canada, for instance, providing knowledge or
means of contraception appeared in the Criminal
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Code as a Crime Against Morality. Governments
were not challenged to justify such laws before the
courts in which they enforced them. Their leaders
rested upon moralistic value systems, often influenced by conservative religious institutions, shared
among governing elites but at variance with the
preferences of most affected residents in the
community.

2. Development of evidence-based law
It was not until the closing decades of the
twentieth century that courts considered it necessary to take responsive account of the actual values
according to which members of the general community attempted to regulate their reproductive
lives. Courts could no longer ignore, for instance,
that the births of healthy children of unplanned
pregnancies were not necessarily received as
blessings. A case that bbust the blessing balloonQ
[1] occurred in 1971, when a pharmacist misread a
prescription for a contraceptive drug (Norinyl) and
provided a woman with a tranquilizer (Nardil)
instead, resulting in birth of her eighth child. Her
claim for negligence required proof of damage, but
the trial judge followed precedent to rule that a
child’s birth could not legally be regarded as a
species of damage. Reversing this ruling, the appeal
court held that:
To say that for reasons of public policy contraceptive failure can result in no damage as a matter of
law ignores the fact that tens of millions of persons
use contraceptives daily to avoid the very result
which the defendant would have us say is always a
benefit, never a detriment. Those tens of millions
of persons, by their conduct, express the sense of
the community [2].
In more recent years, courts in several
countries have become more prepared to find
the principles by reference to which they assess
litigants’ arguments on interpretation of the law
in the realities of how ordinary, mainstream
members of their societies plan and live their
lives. Courts can adopt fact-based reality checks
to measure preferences of legal interpretation
advanced by politically inspired governmental
agencies, by leaders of religious institutions, and
even by judges of courts from whose judgment
appeals have been brought. Judges, accustomed
to the legal duty to give reasons for their own
decisions, require litigants to give reasons for
their arguments of how the law should be
interpreted, and increasingly expect reasons to
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be factually realistic. That is, judges take account
not only of the claims of policy preference or
spiritual values advanced to support arguments of
how the law should be applied, but also of social
utility and effect. An argument of policy or
professed values not supported by evidenced
realities of the social setting in which the court’s
decision will be received and effective may be
rejected as unreasonable or unrealistic.
Recent decisions will illustrate this democratic
development in cases concerning emergency contraception and abortion, but an earlier English
case concerned adolescent access to contraceptive care. In the Gillick case [3], arising in the
early 1980s, a litigant requested a ruling that no
contraceptive care be delivered to her daughters
aged under 16 years without her consent, because
a circular to physicians issued by the Department
of Health and Social Security that claimed that
physicians could deliver such care to a minor of
sufficient understanding without her parent’s
consent or knowledge was unlawful. The Sexual
Offences Act, 1956 declared it criminal to have
intercourse with girls aged under 16 years, and
the mother claimed that equipping her daughters
for intercourse condoned a crime and their
victimization.
The mother requested a ruling not only that
her daughters not be given contraceptive care
without her consent, which she made it clear she
had no intention of giving, but also that they not
receive abortion. The trial judge upheld the
legality of the Department’s circular, finding that
it embodied the long-recognized bmature minorQ
doctrine [4]. However, the Court of Appeal
reversed this decision, and held the mother
entitled to the ruling she requested [5]. On
further appeal, the final appeal court, the House
of Lords, reversed the Court of Appeal and
reinstated the decision of the trial judge [3].
The Court of Appeal’s decision was based on
narrow factual presumptions of parental control
and adolescent compliance, perhaps reflecting the
judges’ refined cultural milieu in which early
teenage daughters did not become sexually active.
It discounted the wider reality in England that
early teenage girls were having pregnancies,
babies and abortions at rates the Department
found alarming. Further, the judges mainly
addressed contraception, paying little regard to
the ruling requested on abortion. Parents are
obliged as a matter of law to provide their
children with medically indicated care, including
therapeutic abortion, and cannot be granted legal
power to veto such treatment. The Court of
Appeal’s judgment on contraception was not

Emergency contraception, abortion and evidence-based law
related to the realities of general social experience, and failed seriously to relate its reasoning to
abortion, and was therefore reversed.
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4. The challenge to emergency
contraception
4.1. Legal facts

3. Introduction of fact evidence
Normally, parties to a case will present evidence
to support their factual claims, but when cases
raise issues of wider concern that transcend the
immediate dispute between the parties, judges
may allow bfriends of the courtQ (amicus curiae)
to present evidence and argument. This practice
recognizes that judicial decisions, perhaps based
on narrow legalistic arguments of construction of
language or precedent, may have social implications that extend far beyond the interests or
perception of the original parties. To reduce
unintended consequences of judgments, judges
may open cases to participation, perhaps on
limited grounds, by representatives of potentially
affected interests, including governmental agencies and non-governmental advocacy groups.
Fact witnesses are people presented as having
direct knowledge of facts in dispute but evidence
may also be presented by bexpert witnessesQ.
Matters of everyday knowledge, such as the
normal period of human gestation, do not require
expert evidence. Judges will rule on whether
expert witnesses are appropriate, but commonly
find that medical and sociological claims justify or
require supporting expert testimony. The role of
expert witnesses is not to serve as advocates for
parties that call (and pay) them, but objectively
to assist judges to determine facts that fall
outside everyday knowledge. Parties request testimony from experts whose evidence the parties
believe will advance their case, but expert witnesses bear them no duty to satisfy their expectations. Judges cannot rely on any non-legal special
or expert knowledge of their own that they may
possess, since facts in dispute must be presented
in court for examination and dispute by all
parties.
Judges rule on whether individuals qualify as
experts, addressing whether their qualifications
and prominence in their alleged field of expertise
are adequate, and whether the expertise they are
found to possess is relevant to the facts in dispute.
Experience in professional practice does not in
itself constitute expertise, since it may be based
on repeated application of commonplace skills or
perceptions. The final question for the court is
how the evidence of expert witnesses for the
different parties coincides or conflicts, and whose
conflicting evidence is more persuasive.

The Smeaton case, commenced in England by the
Society for the Protection of Unborn Children
(SPUC), and decided in 2002, was a narrowly
focused technical claim that the Secretary of State
for Health was not legally entitled under the
Medicines Act 1968 to make the Prescription Only
Medicines (Human Use) Amendment (No. 3) Order
2000 [6]. This allowed registered pharmacists to
supply the emergency (bpost coitalQ or bmorningafterQ) contraceptive drug Levonorgestrel to women aged 16 years and over without a doctor’s
prescription.
The SPUC claimed the drug was abortifacient,
and so governed by the UK Abortion Act 1967. This
Act, drafted by reference to the Offences against
the Person Act 1861, requires the opinion of two
doctors, acting in good faith, that conditions of the
1967 Act are satisfied, otherwise a criminal office is
committed against Section 59 of the 1861 Act. This
provides that any person who supplies a bnoxious
thing. . . knowing that the same is intended to be. . .
used. . . with intent to procure the miscarriage of
any womanQ commits a criminal office. Section 58
of the 1861 Act establishes that the woman need
not be shown to be pregnant for the crime of acting
bwith intent to procure the miscarriageQ to occur.
Narrow though the SPUC claim might appear, the
judge found it to implicate all interventions
intended to prevent fertilization of an ovum or its
implantation in utero, such as many regular contraceptive products and intra-uterine devices. It
was therefore necessary to clarify the law since, as
the judge observed in the first paragraph of his 398
paragraph judgment, bthe outcome of this case
may potentially affect the everyday lives of
hundreds of thousands, indeed millions, of ordinary
men and women in this countryQ [7].
The key legal issues in the case were the
meaning in the 1861 Act of the intention to procure
bmiscarriage,Q which all parties accepted as synonymous with babortion,Q and whether criminal
abortion may result when implantation of a fertilized ovum is deliberately intended to be prevented. Voluminous conflicting historical texts
were cited regarding how miscarriage was construed in 1861, but the judge found this inquiry not
relevant since, as a matter of law, the 1861
legislation is balways speakingQ. This means that it
bshould be interpreted in the light of the current
scientific evidence. . . The proper approach is to
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make use of the best current medical and scientific
knowledge that is availableQ [8]. On the fact of
what bmiscarriageQ or babortionQ means in medical
science at the opening of the 21st century, the
judge was persuaded by the uncontroverted evidence of Dr. Connie Smith, of the Faculty of Family
Planning and Reproductive Health Care of the Royal
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, Professor Steven Smith, Professor of Obstetrics and
Gynaecology at Cambridge University, and, among
others, Professor Chris Barratt, Head of the Reproductive Biology and Genetic Research Unit at the
University of Birmingham. The judge accepted their
evidence that an intention to prevent implantation
of a fertilized ovum is regarded not as abortifacient, but as contraceptive. The judge also accepted scientific evidence that emergency contraceptive drugs have no effect on post-implantation
gestational development.

4.2. Social evidence
The Family Planning Association (fpa) was allowed
to intervene in the proceedings as a party, and
evidence was given on its behalf by its Chief
Executive Officer. She made the case on social
facts for availability of emergency contraception,
in accordance with the 2000 Order, through pharmacies only. The judge considered the fpa argument to warrant detailed attention, bbecause it
sets out what for most people, other than lawyers,
this case is really aboutQ [9]. The judge accepted
the claim that bfpa is uniquely well placed to
inform the court as to the wider implications of this
case and the current reality of the arguments being
put forward by SPUCQ [10].
The information was that emergency contraception is a safe and effective method to prevent
unintended pregnancy, and the only method to
prevent pregnancy after contraceptive failure and
unprotected sex, including by rape. It was estimated that about half of UK pregnancies are unplanned, that about 22% of all pregnancies end in
induced abortion, and that about three-quarters of
women having abortion were using some form of
contraception when they conceived. Research
showed that most women either requesting abortion or continuing an unplanned pregnancy would
have used emergency contraception if they had
known about it, where to get it, and the 72-h postcoital limit on its most effective use. The claim for
off-prescription access was supported by evidence
from countries with off prescription access that
demand increases at weekends and public holidays,
when primary care physicians and family planning
clinics are less available. The conclusions were
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submitted that ease of access to emergency
contraception reduces the demand for abortion,
and that obstructed access would significantly
affect abortion rates.
The judge reached his decision on the meaning
of the 1861 Act and legality of the 2000 Order on
the basis of legal precedents and principles of legal
interpretation. He expressed comfort in his conclusion, however, by referring to evidence of the
social utility of his decision. He observed that:
There would in my judgment be something very
seriously wrong, indeed grievously wrong with our
system — by which I mean not just our legal system
but the entire system by which our polity is
governed — if a judge in 2002 were to be compelled
by a statute 141 years old to hold that what
thousands, hundreds of thousands, indeed millions,
of ordinary honest, decent, law-aiding citizens
have been doing day in day out for so many years
is and always has been criminal. The social case put
by fpa . . . remains wholly unanswered by SPUC [11].

5. Access to abortion
5.1. Legal facts
The Abortion Act 1967 enacted by the UK Parliament has not been extended to Northern Ireland,
where abortion remains governed by the more
restrictive and less clearly expressed Offences
against the Person Act 1861. A result is that each
year, about two thousand women travel from
Northern Ireland, a separate jurisdiction within
the UK, to England, Wales and Scotland (i.e.,
Britain) where they have abortions. These are
lawful under the 1967 Act, and the law of Northern
Ireland is not violated by Northern Irish resident
women having lawful abortions in Britain. A challenge to social justice arises, however, in that
procedures conducted in Britain are not legally
funded under the National Health Service (NHS)
provisions of Northern Ireland, so that those
personally unable to meet expenses, estimated at
between o500 and o1200 for service and travel
costs, cannot avail themselves of services. Further,
many who travel, or cannot afford to travel, are
legally eligible to have lawful abortion services in
Northern Ireland under the 1861 Act, but physicians
refuse to undertake them. Some refuse on religious
grounds, but others with no conscientious objection
in principle are fearful that, because of uncertainty
in the law, they may face prosecution were they to
proceed. Punishment for committing unlawful
abortion is up to life imprisonment.
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Against this legal background, the Family Planning Association of Northern Ireland (FPANI) sued
the Minister of Health, Social Services and Public
Safety in Northern Ireland, applying for a judicial
declaration that the Ministry acted unlawfully in
failing to issue advice and/or guidance to women of
reproductive age, and to physicians within the
jurisdiction, on availability and provision of lawful
abortion services. The FPANI also applied for a
judicial declaration that the defendant Ministry has
unlawfully failed both to investigate whether
women are receiving satisfactory abortion services
in Northern Ireland, and to make, or secure the
making of, necessary arrangements to ensure
satisfactory abortion services [12].
The trial judge, who subsequently became the
Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, denied the
declarations and dismissed the applications, but
helpfully clarified the law, and paved the way for
the Court of Appeal’s decision. The 1861 Act
contains the abortion law of Northern Ireland and
the background law in England, as the Smeaton
case [7] shows. Section 58 of the Act provides that:
Every woman. . .who, with intent to procure her
own miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to
herself any poison. . .or shall unlawfully use any
instrument. . .with the like intent, and whosoever. . .shall unlawfully administer to her. . .any poison. . .or shall unlawfully use any instrument. . .with
the like intent, shall be guilty of a felony.
Repetition that it is a felony to administer
substances or use instruments bunlawfullyQ raises
the question whether substances or instruments
may be applied blawfullyQ.
That question remained unanswered until 1938,
when an English court ruled in the Bourne case [13]
that abortion is lawful when a person undertakes it
with intent to preserve a woman’s life, or her
continuing physical or mental health, endangered
by continuation of pregnancy. Further, a procedure
need not be delayed in anticipation of such danger
until death or prolonged incapacity is imminent.
The Bourne ruling has been widely followed in the
Commonwealth and beyond [14], and never judicially contradicted, but its application in Northern
Ireland had not been judicially endorsed with
certainty. In several cases, trial judges had presumed its applicability, but in generally unreported
and unpublicized judgments. However, in the FPANI
case, the trial judge authoritatively ruled that the
Bourne judgment represents the law in Northern
Ireland. The trial judge dismissed the FPANI application for declarations on the ground that his ruling
now provided the community with adequate clarity.
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5.2. Social evidence
Reviewing evidence of women’s access to abortion
services in Northern Ireland, the three Court of
Appeal judges unanimously disagreed with the trial
judge that his ruling, rejecting the FPANI claim,
sufficiently provided physicians in the jurisdiction
with the confidence to undertake abortions they
considered in their patients’ health interests.
Physicians remained exposed to the risk of prosecution, instigated perhaps with the encouragement
of activist associations such as SPUC. Further, since
providers of abortion services were liable to severe
punishment, the law required clarification on the
burden of proof; that is, whether the prosecution
must show that the service provider did not believe
the woman to be in serious danger of death or
prolonged impairment, or whether the defence
must show the provider acted honestly in that
belief. An additional issue was uncertainty about
termination of pregnancy of non-viable fetuses,
and of grossly abnormal viable fetuses.
Legal provisions in Northern Ireland of 1972 [15]
require the Ministry to ensure integrated health
services to promote physical and mental health,
and personal social services to promote social
welfare, so as to secure effective co-ordination of
health and personal social services. The duty
applies to aftercare, health information and, for
instance, service advice, guidance and assistance.
The Ministry must discharge these duties, however,
only bto such extent as it considers necessaryQ. The
Ministry’s reply to the FPANI complaints was that it
had lawfully exercised its discretion in deciding
that no action was required on its part regarding
abortion services.
FPANI introduced extensive social evidence and
medical expert witnesses, to show widespread
medical professional uncertainty about, and fear
of, the law, and consequent hardship suffered by
women denied abortion services in Northern Ireland, and abortion aftercare services following
procedures in Britain, who were legally eligible to
receive services in Northern Ireland. The Ministry’s
defence that it provided adequate services was
compromised by evidence that it had acquired no
reliable information of the extent of services
required. It had failed to investigate evidence,
including through a judge’s complaint that no
physician in Northern Ireland would undertake an
abortion he had judicially approved [16], of the
unmet need for services, of why women in Northern
Ireland did not consult their local physicians before
obtaining procedures in Britain, on the extent of
procedures in Britain for which women returning to
Northern Ireland required aftercare, or on the
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extent of self-induced and unskilled procedures
within its jurisdiction. The Ministry had similarly
failed to consider the legal position regarding
abortion of non-viable and grossly abnormal viable
fetuses.
In concluding his judgment, Lord Justice Nicholson observed that:
on the available evidence I am of the opinion that
the [Ministerial] department has not merely been
guilty of non-feasance [i.e. omission to act] but has
decided not to carry out duties required of it. . .It
might be more appropriate to describe the department’s conduct as seeking to avoid its responsibilities [17].
He had previously found that:
An inference [of presented evidence] is that the
department does not regard itself under an obligation to provide aftercare for those who return to
Northern Ireland after an abortion in England. If so,
the department is in breach. . .of the 1972 Order
[18].
Lord Justice Campbell similarly concluded that:
The cumulative effect of the evidence is to
demonstrate a failure to provide the breadth of
service that is appropriate. . .the Department has
created the impression that it has distanced itself
from this [abortion] service. . .The very considerable degree of latitude given to the Department
does not mean that it can decline even to inform
itself if there is a need for services that is not being
met [19].
Lord Justice Nicholson summarized how he
considered the Ministry’s guidance on the law
should be expressed [20], but the three appeal
judges refrained from directing Ministerial action
other than to conduct comprehensive investigations. These would be into such matters as
abortions available under the 1861 Act that
physicians decline to undertake, physicians’ experience of women resorting to unskilled abortion-related interventions, numbers of women
returning to Northern Ireland following abortions
in Britain and the aftercare they require, including counselling and assisting women with unplanned pregnancies to obtain medical advice,
information on all of their options, and nondirective counselling. The judges accepted that,
once informed with relevant evidence from its
own investigations and from medical colleges and
associations, the Ministry would undertake appropriate action to discharge its legal responsibilities
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for women’s access to abortion-related services.
The Court also established, however, that judges
could review subsequent ministerial decision-making and conduct alleged still to violate legal
responsibilities.

6. Human rights
Neither the Smeaton case nor the Northern
Ireland abortion case was significantly argued on
human rights principles, and accordingly, the
judges who addressed human rights aspects of
the claims made no decisions on the grounds of
such principles. However, human rights were
central to the first abortion case decided, in
October 2005, by the UN Human Rights Committee [21]. A 17-year old minor in Lima, Peru, was
14 weeks pregnant when ultrasound diagnosed an
anencephalic fetus. A gynecologist—obstetrician
found danger to the minor’s life and, with support
of her mother, recommended abortion. A psychiatrist also found danger to the minor’s mental
health from continuation of pregnancy. The law in
Peru, like the 1861 Act in Northern Ireland,
permits abortion on evidence of danger to a
woman’s life or continuing mental health. Nevertheless, the Director of the hospital, with support
of the national Ministry of Health, refused
approval. The minor was compelled to deliver
the child, and to breast feed it for 4 days before
it predictably died, leaving the minor with severe
depression.
The Human Rights Committee, in proceedings
the government of Peru did not defend, found
Peru responsible for multiple violations of the UN
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Violation was found of Article 7, which
provides that bNo one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatmentQ, and of Article 17, which states that
bNo one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his privacy [or] familyQ, from denial of access to a lawful therapeutic
abortion. Article 24 was violated in denial of
health protection required for minors. The state
violated its duty, under Article 2, to respect and
ensure an individual’s rights under the Covenant,
and provide remedies to correct breaches. The
Human Rights Committee required Peru to provide
the minor with a remedy including compensation,
and to adopt measures to prevent future violations, including publishing clear regulations specifying women’s rights to lawful abortion and
ensuring means of effective access to medical
services [22].
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7. Conclusion
National courts of law and international tribunals
are increasingly requiring governmental conduct to
be reasonable and rational in light of demonstrated
evidence. Where evidence shows that individuals’
rights are violated, governments are legally required to provide effective remedies, including for
prevention of future violations. Where evidence
shows violations of rights due to uncertainty in the
meaning of laws, governments are required to
provide clarification, particularly to those most
affected by the laws. In the context of reproductive
health, medical and related health care providers,
and actual and prospective patients, are legally
entitled to guidance by health ministries on rights
respectively to deliver indicated services, and to
access such services.
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